

**REFLECTIONS ON JAPANESE AMERICAN SECURITY  
RELATIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA**

**(1995)**

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**GEOGRAPHY IS FATE**

"The people of Wa live in the middle of the ocean on mountainous islands Southeast of Taifang."

So begins the Gishi Wajinden, the portion of the Wei Chronicles which describe Japan and the Japanese during the third century of the modern era. These texts are not the first Chinese references to Wa or the early Japanese but they offer considerable detail about life on their islands at that time, most notably, enduring characteristics such as the clapping of hands to draw the attention of the gods, squatting or kneeling as a sign of reverence, and an pronounced fondness for drink - not particular, admittedly, to the Japanese. The Chronicles also speak, somewhat poignantly, of isolation, of being foreign, of being at sea, disconnected from the great civilization of China and the continent of Asia.

However different Japan has become since that distant era, its geography and physical linkages to the continent have not changed. Japan remains, in a surprising number of ways, "in the middle of the ocean", a country of the Western Pacific more than East Asia, and this has to be the starting point of any understanding of Japan's security concerns and the policies that emerge from them. Unlike the Koreans, with their physical links to the Asian land mass, Eastern Siberia as subsidiary to European Russia, Taiwan with its symbiotic ties to China, Japan in more ways than many realize occupies a space shared by no others, at times adrift in the Pacific Ocean, maintaining ties of its choosing and for its convenience.

For until the modern era, geography was everything: proximity to the continent counted, but accessibility was, until recently, something else again. The islands inhabited by the Japanese physically separated from the mainland about 25,000 years ago. While the waterways separating them from the continent were not especially broad, primitive vessels and weak navigation skills made the Korea and Laperouse Straights, and the East China Sea virtually unnavigable. Moreover, relatively hostile weather conditions and poor agricultural potential on the western, continent-facing side of the is-

lands; further discouraged movement from the Korean peninsula or Eastern China. Population centers and administrative capitals have all been on the Pacific Ocean facing eastern coast of the islands. (Very recent archeological evidence strengthens the thesis that the fabled "Yamataikoku" was in the Kinai district rather than in northern Kyushu.)

Of course, the Japanese did not descend *sui generis* from the Gods (no matter what some Rightists might want us to think). Indeed, population movements from the continent to Japan were considerable during the 1,000 or so years to the 8th century - at times up to 10,000 per year according to some estimates. According to an early census, one third of the Nara nobility was recognized as being of foreign origin.

The first extended period of national isolation dates from the middle of the 9th century. Subsequently, there was only very limited migration to the Japanese islands between the 9th to the late 19th century. The Tokugawa "sakoku" strictures against any entry were particularly severe.

This worked both ways. Outside of the years of colonization of Korea beginning in the late 19th century and Empire over Taiwan.

China and parts of South East Asia, there was no movement from Japan to the Continent for purposes of settlement. Japanese who lived and worked in the short-lived "Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" and survived defeat virtually all returned to Japan. Japanese emigration has thus been largely eastward, to Latin and Central America, the United States, and Canada.

Japanese physical isolation was such that threats of foreign invasion in the 1500 years of written history were limited to three: Tang China in the 7th century and the Mongols in the 13th - both unsuccessful - and the incursions of European and American traders and imperial powers beginning in the mid 19th century, which the Japanese also staved off, by adopting Western political and military institutions. In all of its history, Japan has only been occupied once: by MacArthur and the Allied Command from 1945 to 1952; and has had only three military alliances: Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-1923), the Tripartite Anti-Comintern Pact (1936-1945) and the US/ Japan Security Treaty (1952 to the present).

Until the late 19th century, successive Japanese governments also left the Continent pretty well to its own devices: between 662 AD and the 1880s, it attempted only one invasion, that of Shogun Hid-eyoshi (from 1592 to 1597). It failed miserably on the Korean pen-

insula - Hideyoshi was somewhat ambitiously targeting China and India.

The failures of Japan's continental invasions of the 1930s and 40s and the attacks against the United States and Britain are seared not only on the minds of all of those who suffered and survived their occupation or their prison camps, but also the Japanese themselves; because it is of this century, it speaks of Japanese militarism and its martial history; but other than the 50 years of continental adventurism, between the victory over China in 1895 and defeat in 1945, the Japanese have kept to themselves on their islands and kept their conflicts strictly internecine.

One outcome of this history has been an island nation enjoying and promoting - to the extent that the 20th century still allows - its sense of isolation, the post-war version of which has been non-engagement in international political and security affairs, dependence on the regional version of "Pax America" and a liberal international trading regime. The Wei Chroniclers might still recognize the nation they once visited.

## **NOTHING LIKE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SHIFT THE PARADIGM**

If the Japanese learned anything from their imperial adventures and defeat in the Asian and Pacific wars, it was the enduring value of their tradition of keeping their military on their home islands, and finding other means to achieve their national security objectives. The US Occupation initially nurtured this attitude, first through disarming Japan and demobilizing its troops, and then through the introduction of Article 9 of the Constitution which states, inter alia, that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes".

There, it might have remained, were it not for atomic weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles and the Cold War. The Soviet explosion of its first atomic weapon in 1949 and the Korean war changed the strategic situation completely for Japan, as it did for the United States, Canada and the West. Japan became an indispensable component of American forward deployment strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Although General MacArthur had, as early as the late 1940s, turned his mind to ending the Occupation, US policy shifted dramatically following the Korean conflict. It sought to turn Japan into a staunch ally that would allow the basing of considerable US

military power on its islands, and allow them to be used to project American power.

In its basic formulation, the US/Japan agreement that emerged at the end of the Occupation was - and remains - simple: the United States is committed to defending "the territories under the administration of Japan" by virtue of the 1952 and 1960 treaties of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States. In exchange for this protection, and "for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan".

Simple it may be but until the end of the Cold War, what made it particularly enduring was the nature and threat of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems. Soviet ICBMs date from 1957. The Chinese exploded their first nuclear device in 1964. An essentially disarmed Japan has had no independent means of defending itself against a nuclear attack. It was this strategic threat to both Japan (from land based ICBMs in Siberia and China) and to the continental United States (including from SLBMs operating in

the Sea of Japan in the 1970s and 80s) which became the backbone of the US/Japan alliance. That and, to a much lesser extent, the possibility of a conventional attack against the Japanese islands.

In 1950, this did not appear to be beyond the realm of the possible. The outbreak of the Korean War in June forced the United States to despatch virtually all of its Occupation Forces to the Korean Peninsula. Japan was totally defenceless and thought to be extremely vulnerable to attack, in particular by Russia, descending from the Kuriles towards Hokkaido. By October of that year and at US insistence, a 75,000 man "Police Reserve" was established and recruited (initially without former Imperial military officers, but this was soon to change), trained and equipped by the USA. The Imperial Japanese Navy had been disbanded in 1945, but parts were never decommissioned as the US and Japan needed Japanese vessels to repatriate the 2 million Japanese remaining in the former colonies, and demining activities around Japan had to be pursued. Indeed, Japanese vessels and crews undertook most of the demining activities around the Korean Peninsula and much of the merchant shipping throughout the conflict. In 1954, the existing forces were reorganized into the Japan Self-Defence Force, with an

authorized strength level of 150,000 ground troops, 15,000 maritime, and 6,500 air. The Japan Defence Agency was also established at that time, under the Office of the Prime Minister. (It is still not formally a ministry, although this may change with government reorganization.)

Despite a Constitution that states that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained", the constitutional problem of training and equipping troops was circumvented by adopting, in Japanese eyes at least, strictly defensive military doctrines and receiving from the US or purchasing defensive weapons only. Because in principle (and, at least in the first decades, in fact) these forces could not be used effectively for offensive purposes, they were deemed not to be, in effect, "war potential", and therefore out of the ambit of constitutional restriction. (This interpretation has been disputed in the courts, with one case dragging on for 31 years, but the Supreme Court has consistently dodged and evaded the fundamental issue, deeming the SDF to be the result of an "Act of State", a "fundamental problem of national administration that has the highest political character, so is not subject to our legal review". It is important to bear in mind therefore when being told that some

types of military action would be "unconstitutional", that these are matters of interpretation by the Administrative arm of the Japanese government, subject not to the courts, but to political judgement and popular opinion.)

Fear of conventional threats against Japan faded in the 1950s and 60s, but this was against the backdrop of increasing US/Soviet antagonism and tension, and huge expansion in the number and variety, as well as geographic proliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan, having chosen not to arm itself with a nuclear deterrent by virtue of its Three Non-nuclear Principles (not to manufacture, possess or allow the entry of nuclear weapons - which, it should be added, have otherwise been deemed to be "constitutional" by several past Japanese administrations) essentially took a back seat on matters of national defence. The US/Japan Treaty and "senshu boei" (minimum necessary defensive capability only) basically defined and circumscribed Japanese defence from 1947 to the mid-90s, and are still at the core of Japan's defence strategy.

Major policy stances are phrased in the negative: the Three Non-nuclear Principles; policies against export of weapons or military

technologies (with some important exceptions vis-a-vis the United States); the freeze on "peacekeeping forces", which effectively prevents Japan from participating in any PKO activity which risks the life of any soldier or civilian. It is as if Canada relied solely on a policy of continental isolationism and NORAD defence, but threw in a bit of PKO rear area support to make life in the military at least somewhat distracting.

At the political level, there has been a concomitant allergy among politicians with any degree of prominence to address defence issues in public (a notable exception was Nakasone). The Socialist Party spent 30 years out of power holding to the view that the SDF was unconstitutional, but jettisoned that policy with hardly an afterthought and no public debate when Murayama became Prime Minister. The 1995 National Defence Policy Outline (NDPO), whose function is comparable to Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper, was not extensively discussed in Cabinet, nor formally submitted to the Diet, nor taken up by either the Upper or Lower House foreign and defence policy committees (the Lower House Committee having only come into existence in 1992).

Until the end of the Cold War therefore, Japanese defence basically consisted of offering a complex of bases and facilities for the for-

ward deployment of US Army, Marines and Air Force, and as Headquarters and home base for the 7th Fleet. Its military capabilities focused on support for the United States in the strategic competition with the Soviet Union, and defence of the homeland, through an interweaving of (a) coastal defence arguably one of the best in the world, primarily through ASW, AAW, Anti-surface warfare and mine warfare; (b) air defence, through surveillance, attack aircraft, AAMs and ASMs, and as a last resort (c) ground defence, with reliance on SAMs, light artillery, and tank warfare.

This posture has led many informed observers and players - a small group consisting of MFA and JDA officials, Diet members, academics and outside defence critics - to question, not entirely rhetorically, whether Japan has anything that might be considered an independent defence policy. Nakasone, when he was Director General of the Japan Defence Agency in the early 70s had sought to place, conceptually at least, the USJapan Security Treaty in the context of an over-arching national defence policy. But the financial implications of a more independent posture, the outrage expressed by China in particular, the outright opposition of the strongest pro-American members of the LDP and, right out of left field, the spectacular suicide of writer Mishima Yukio at the

Eastern Army Headquarters in Ichigaya in 1970 cooled whatever support he could muster and the initiative died in on the pages of the 1970 White Paper. Even as Prime Minister, he did little other than remove a self-imposed ceiling on defence expenditures of 1 % of GDP, make speeches, noisily support Ronald Reagan (Nakasone: "the Japanese archipelago should stand as a powerful bulwark against infiltration by Soviet Backfire bombers, like an unsinkable aircraft carrier"; Soviet response: "We will see how unsinkable it really is") and visit the Yasukuni Shrine, to assert that "the post-war period is over and it is time to move on".

### **THAT WAS THEN AND THIS IS NOW**

The geopolitical situation in the Pacific North West may be vastly different from that faced by the countries of the Atlantic Alliance, but the Cold War is no less over in Asia than it is in Europe.

different times, and under different circumstances. If the November '89 collapse of the Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain was the pivotal event for the Atlantic Alliance, the 1991 implosion of the Soviet Union signalled the end of the War in Asia.

It is the virtual collapse of Soviet era naval and air power in Eastern Siberia that has changed the security situation for Japan and the

region. It has drastically reduced if not entirely removed the SLBM and ICBM threat against the continental United States and Japan. According to Taoka Shunji of the Asahi Shimbun, the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces sighted only 9 Russian navy vessels in the Sea of Japan in 1996, versus 141 in 1987. Less than 10% of Russia's Pacific Fleet (55 major surface ships) is fully operational. Russian pilots are flying only 20 to 30 hours *per year*, 10% of US training levels, and one fifth of Japanese.

Russian and Chinese muscle flexing along their common border has been replaced by troop reduction agreements, CBMs and trade. Chinese military modernization is focused on a build-down of its ground and air power and modernization of what remains primarily a coastal fleet. The DPRK nuclear program has been overtaken by KEDO. The strategic threats, actual or potential, that dominated security concerns a decade ago are, for the moment at least, largely tamed.

Risks to peace and security are no less real, but no longer global in reach, or strategic in intent. The most immediate concerns are DPRK aggression against the ROK, followed

by Chinese assertion of the right to use force to reunite with Taiwan, and territorial claims over the Spratleys that could impact on the security of sea lanes. More distant worries include piracy and illegal movement of immigrants. Nor can we forget conflicting territorial claims in the North Pacific between Russia and Japan (the Northern Islands), Korea and Japan (Tokdo/Takeshima) and Taiwan/China and Japan (Senkaku/Diaoyutai).

But the point remains that these are not nuclear threats. Almost overnight, Japan's strategic importance to the United States has been dramatically reduced. That alone would call into question the foundations of the USA/Japan Security Treaty and, concomitantly, Japan's overall security policies.

But two other events have forced a rethinking of Japan's strategies and regional role. The Gulf war posed a major challenge to Japan, one that it did not initially recognize. Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was initially viewed, even by diplomats at the Foreign Ministry, as a local affair that would not affect Japan's strategic interests: after all, once Iraqi forces were in control of the situation, oil shipments would resume through the Strait of Hormuz. **If** the oil trade could manage the Iran-Iraq war, it could survive Kuwait. The strategic di-

mension of Saddam's actions did not initially impress themselves on the Japanese.

The American and European response to the situation did however, and strongly. Lack of early Japanese support for multinational action in the Gulf was the subject of much commentary in capitals in the West and in the media. While Japan's political leaders dithered, whatever credit it had been accumulating for other forms of international engagement (principally ODA) lost much of its credibility. Ultimately, Japan provided US\$13 billion in financial support to the US and other major actors in the Gulf conflict, but when the Al Sabah family placed one page ads in the world's major newspapers to express its thanks to the international community for driving the Iraqis from Kuwait, Japan's contribution was not mentioned.

Equally significant but perhaps less well-known are lessons learned from the security crisis on the Korean peninsula in 1993-94. Fears that the DPRK had developed a small number of nuclear weapons, test firings of Rodong missiles into the Japan Sea, suggesting that delivery systems were being developed and unremittingly hostile propaganda from the North towards the ROK. Japan and the USA

caused the United States to undertake an in-depth examination of, among other things, the mechanisms in place to implement US/ Japan cooperation in the event of a DPRK attack against South Korea. What the Americans discovered was that little if anything was in place, either within Japan or in terms of Japanese rear support for US efforts on the high seas and in the air. Concentration on strategic threats from Russia and China had dulled US and Japanese efforts to put in place the mechanisms for effective cooperation in times of crisis. Provisions under article II of the 1960 Status of Forces Agreement to the effect that "agreements as to specific facilities and areas shall be concluded between the two governments" were in fact not in place. Most of the Defence Cooperation Guidelines

agreed upon in 1978 - the predecessor to the current Guidelines - had never been actioned. Furthermore, Japan's lack of crisis management skills was glaringly exposed in the aftermath of Great Hanshin Earthquake. To those on the inside, it became apparent that the US-Japan Security Treaty might not deliver the goods when they were needed in a conventional crisis.

**TO BE OR NOT TO BE (AN ALLY)**

All of this had to lead in Japan to a serious re-examination of the value and the workings of the US/Japan security treaty and Japan's basic defence and security policies. The issues were stark.

With the reduction if not elimination of the Russian nuclear threat, Japan's value to US continental security was dramatically reduced. Conversely, the reduction if not total absence of both strategic and conventional Russian threats against the Japanese islands led many credible commentators, academics, politicians and journalists to raise serious questions about the continuing need for the alliance with the US. Any such reflection begs the question of what, in effect, Japan's security policies should be. *Mutatis mutandis*, this leads to even broader questions of Japan's foreign policies and the tools to implement them. For some, it leads to the conclusion that a minimal adjustment would be the separation of the Security Treaty from the issue of permanent US bases in Japan, in other words questioning the value, given US lift capability, of forward deployment.

Even more fundamental issues are exposed. The strategic nuclear threat and Japan's total reliance on the US nuclear umbrella provided the Constitution's Article 9 a certain precision and conciseness. After all, if the threat is primarily viewed as an issue of national survival, and if deterrence is to be assured by the United

States, it is easier to be a constitutional purist and to take an entirely defensive posture. But if the threats are conventional, your interests are global, your *only* ally expects support in a crisis that may take place outside your territory, a security policy that is premised only on protecting the home islands and an constitutional interpretation that prevents action beyond your territory - where ship-destroying mines may be laid, or energy supplies obstructed or Japanese citizens held hostage or your commercial aircraft threatened - such passivity, constitutional or otherwise, becomes untenable. The shift in focus from essentially strategic to primarily conventional threats has more clearly exposed the implications of Article 9 on the US-Japan Security Treaty.

The Japanese government and much of the media was consumed with these questions during the first half of the 1990s. It was impossible to pick up a weekly or one of the fine monthly magazines in Japan and not find an article on Japan's defence or foreign policies. What has emerged from this exercise is nothing short of a major shift in Japan's foreign and security policies, one that is still taking shape. While not the subject of this paper, the diplomatic changes are well worth noting:  
the UN Security Council;

- from a prohibition against sending JSDF troops abroad, to passing of a Peace Cooperation Law which allows participation in a range of international peacekeeping activities, and humanitarian rescue operations;
- from tentative regional diplomacy to laying the ground-work for the eventual establishment of the ARF (some in the MFA consider it to be a Japanese invention, along with APEC);
- from the rigid, interests-led issues management of relations with Russia and China to building on the broad and forward looking principles for expanding the relationships, anticipated in the 1980s.

Much of this was inconceivable up to the end of the 80s. Equally unimaginable a decade ago has been the defence debate and the directions that it has established.

## **REDEFINING NATIONAL DEFENCE**

The challenges to conventional defence thinking were so glaring that even the short lived Hosokawa reform government was able to initiate a review of Japan's 1976 basic defense plan, beginning in 1993. A Prime Ministerial Advisory Committee, made up of politicians, commentators and academics provided initial input. After a good deal of discussion - most of it confined to the political parties

and the government bureaucracy, to the immense frustration of outside commentators - in late 1995, the Murayama Government adopted a new "National Defense Program Outline". Above all else, and in spite of the rancour caused by a heinous rape incident in Okinawa, the new plan pledged to reinforce the security alliance with the US.

That pledge was made in recognition of shifting objectives. While the 1976 plan was geared to the Cold War and the perceived threat of attack from the Soviet Union to the north, the 1995 "Taiko", as it is referred to, identified regional instability as the potential threat to the security of Japan. It also stated at the outset that Japan must contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security, indeed has begun to do so through its participation in peace keeping. After listing current sources of instability border conflicts, religious and ethnic wars etc - it flagged the reality of mutual dependence.

The fundamental defence concept it embraces is straightforward: "possessing the minimum necessary defense capability for an independent nation so that it would not become a source of instability in its neighbouring region by creating a vacuum of power rather than

seeking to directly counter a military threat to Japan". The underpinnings of this concept remain Article 9 of the Constitution (now defined as the right to maintain a defense-oriented policy), the three Non-Nuclear Principles, and the US/Japan Treaty.

So far, this is standard boiler plate. The innovation is in the new roles that Japanese defence policy and the SDF would be allowed to play: "contributing to the creation of a more stable security environment" (read: actively support the USA in the rear and beyond Japan's borders) and "responding to large scale disasters and various other situations" (read: dispatching the SDF abroad for emergency assistance and relief activities). Both of these expanded roles imply, indeed require, that Japan continues on the path of internationalizing its security delivery mechanisms and its decision making systems on peace and security matters; provide appropriate training and equipment for a larger SDF role; and engage more actively in international peace and security diplomacy, if only to shape decisions in ways that meet their national interests. The Taiko states explicitly that "the promotion of bilateral dialogues" and "the search for a regional security framework" are to be pursued. For Japan, all this is nothing short of revolutionary.

These objectives also parallel the US Department of Defense's own East Asian Strategy issued earlier in 1995. It too made reference to the need for Japan to contribute to the creation of a more stable security environment, hinting that the country would have to begin to look a little further outward in its obligations and perhaps become a more dependable and militarily engaged partner to the US in the event of a regional dispute. Furthermore, while initial post-cold war calculations envisioned a peace dividend that would allow the US to reduce forces stationed in Asia, the new American calculation concluded that there were just as many potential threats within the region itself to justify maintaining Cold War levels.

and deliberate, albeit incremental. In 1994, a taboo dating from the 1970s was broken when the constitutionality of collective self-defense was debated in the Diet committee on foreign affairs.

Though inconclusive, it revealed the direction in which the country is headed. The Prime Minister's Advisory Committee recommended that Japan move from a passive posture to become an active player on security issues, with some members linking such activism to a clearer definition of national interest and national security. Although the Taiko studiously avoids making reference to collective security, many continue to argue that for Japan to assume a permanent seat

on the UN Security Council, it must ultimately accept and participate in some form of collective security.

## **COOPERATING WITH YOUR ALLY**

In April, 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto met in Japan and issued a "U.S. Japan Joint Declaration on Security" which reaffirmed the centrality of the alliance to Japan's defence but added new emphasis on Japan's support for U.S. military efforts when the Far East region is threatened or, equally significantly, when Japan's fundamental interests (presumably including economic) are potentially compromised.

To put the latter policy into effect, the President and the Prime Minister instructed their officials to undertake consultations on a new framework for cooperation in the area of defence, updating a 1978 set of Guidelines dealing primarily with territorial defence. (Many of these, as stated above, were never implemented.) The new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, approved in September 1997 by the 17th Security

Consultative Committee (the "2 +2" group of American and Japanese foreign and defence ministers) define the following:

cooperate under normal circumstances in actions responding to an armed attack against Japan, and

- cooperation in areas surrounding Japan where Japan's peace and security is threatened.

The Japanese and Americans initially drafted a list of 40 areas where this cooperation could take place. Two sub-sets of issues are raised: what Japan would undertake domestically; and what Japan would undertake outside its maritime borders. These subsets were retained when the final Guidelines were issued.

The first set largely deals with logistic issues, most of which many had assumed had been put in place decades ago. These include designating SDF and civilian ports and airports as rear base areas to support US military engaged during combat; supply and transportation of petroleum, oil and lubricants and other goods (but not ordnance); medical treatment of casualties etc.

That a 45 year old alliance had still not dealt with such basic issues speaks volumes not only about the focus, during the Cold War, on

the strategic threat from the Soviet Union, but also the largely responsive stance of Japan's bureaucracy on matters of security, and the propensity of the US government to go it alone, knowing the pitfalls of trying to engage Japanese politicians on real security issues: the USA bombed North Vietnam from Okinawa both before and after the island's reversion to Japan in 1972; according to former Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, in a famous statement he made a number of years ago, the US as a matter of course brings nuclear weapons into Japan, despite the non-nuclear principles etc. None of this of course has had formal Japanese concurrence.

Responding to conventional threats on the Korean peninsula or elsewhere in the region no longer allows this degree of unpreparedness. The US increasingly needs the support of its allies, in Asia no less than in Europe, even as it insists on calling most of the shots. They require access to ports, airports, roads, supplies and intelligence. If effective crisis management is in doubt, spelling things out becomes essential.

More significantly, these parts of the Guidelines hold the possibility of support for US forces outside the "Far East", usually defined as the maritime region north of the Philippines, through which run two

major sea lanes. Government spokesmen, starting with the Prime Minister, have been scrupulous in avoiding geographic definitions, beyond stating that "in general", these would deal with events in the immediate vicinity of Japan. The Guidelines state explicitly that the concept of "areas around Japan is not geographic but situational". Formulations would provoke, for example, with China, if the Taiwan Straits were included, or with Taiwan and some elements in the USA if they were not. Furthermore, there is an aversion for direct language when speaking to the public on defence issues. More valid reasons in support of ambiguity include the fact that Japanese government, of any stripe, must keep maximum strategic flexibility, leaving actual decisions on whether and how to support to the USA in its actions to the circumstances that arise, and the capacity limits of the Self-Defence Forces. And again, it must be borne in mind that we are speaking here of support by Japan of US action outside Japanese territory.

### **MOVING BEYOND THE US/JAPAN SECURITY TREATY**

Indeed, where the ground-rules have changed most markedly however is with respect to "beyond national boundary" functions that the Japanese might assume either' in cooperation with or independently of the United States: humanitarian relief operations; **UN** peacekeep-

ing operations; search and rescue; non-combatant evacuation operations; ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions.

For Japan, most of this is new, although some issues were flagged in the 1995 NDPO and have been subsequently noted in the 1996 and 1997 Defence White Papers. (The active provisions of the International Peace Cooperation Law which legally authorizes authorized PKO operations have been "frozen" until further parliamentary review, leaving only rear support activities in place. This situation has not been changed by the Guidelines.)

How these additional tasks would be performed, under what circumstances:

UNSC resolution cover is required etc still remains to be discussed and, prob~ debated. What is clear however is that Japan's political and bureaucratic leaders.

to give Japan as much flexibility as possible in determining when and where these pc.. of the Guidelines would apply.

### **WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR CANADA?**

Canada's interests are affected by these developments in a number of important ways.

Firstly, at a strategic level, anything that strengthens US ability to maintain peace and security in Asia is to be welcomed, and that will remain the case until an equally strong and perhaps multilateral institution can take its place.

Secondly, the roles that Japan is considering in other areas are, potentially, of great significance. The types of circumstances that could trigger Japanese engagement in, say, sanctions enforcement or search and rescue "in areas surrounding Japan" could very conceivably also involve Canadian and other forces as well, if not through joint action, than perhaps by simply finding ourselves in the same parts or near the same theatre of conflict.

What is equally clear is that the thrust provided by Guidelines negotiations and eventual implementation will force further changes in

Japanese defence policies.

- Opening the door to military activities outside Japanese territory will invite

further exploration of other possible forms of support for maintenance of peace and security, such as transportation of supplies, use of MSDF ships to rescue non-combatants etc;

- Introducing UNSC decisions into the Japanese policy mix, at a time when

Japan is seeking a more active UN diplomacy will also invite other forms of cooperation involving the Japanese military, especially Peace Building and Peace Keeping;

- Japan does not now claim the "inherent right of collective self-defence"

enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, although one leading constitutional interpretation is to the effect that it does in fact possess that right, it just doesn't exercise it! However, a Japan that has the world's second largest GDP and remains a major trading nation, that seeks to play a direct role in the UN, that commits itself to the development of a regional security framework, that calls for increased bilateral contact and dialogue and that is being pressed to share a greater degree of responsibility by the USA will have to find a workable constitutional interpretation and set of mechanisms to play an active and cooperative role in the maintenance of peace. Within a half decade, they will likely do so.

A broader and, internationally, more cooperative security policy will also be increasingly able to address the security needs of third countries, including Canada. Japan has now established Political Military Talks with a number of countries including Australia, the

U.K., France and Korea. The first Canada/Japan Talks took place in September, 1997. These talks are essential building blocks towards conducting "normal" relations with Japan. Specifically, they have provided Canada with a mechanism to strengthen established cooperative programs such as ships visits, personnel exchanges, Staff Talks, PKO policy dialogue and joint activities such as security seminars etc. Furthermore, they provide a venue to raise certain issues that will have to be solved in the future, if they cannot be resolved at present. These are overwhelmingly in the area of military to military relations. Japan having only one basic security arrangement, and an overwhelming one at that, and eschewing as it does "cooperative security", it does not have any legal or administrative means of addressing issue such as the following:

a) Japan has only two Status of Forces Agreements: with the USA and with the UN; Canadian and other countries' military flights, such as fly throughs and stopovers by veteran groups can only be authorized under the UN SOFA; in some cases however, the UN cover is fanciful at best; the Japanese need a Visiting Forces Agreement, but do not have one.

b) Non-US manufacturers of military goods and technologies wish to market and, if successful, service their products in Japan; the absence of bilateral defence

intelligence security agreements however prevents them from benefiting from a level playing field when bidding to supply the SDF with equipment, and obtaining access to secure facilities at bases or on the manufacturing floor of companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy Industries etc. Many countries have intelligence security agreements with the United States, as the US has with Japan; what is needed is to triangulate these so that other countries can develop industrial ties with Japan's defence industries; currently however, there are no Japanese mechanisms to do so.

c) Many non-US firms are also seeking formal cooperation agreements with Japanese manufacturers of military equipment. While American firms operate under a technology cooperation agreement, this is not available to non-US companies, at a time when the development of new technologies of interest to the Japanese military is not limited to the United States.

d) Two years ago, Canadian P3 aircraft assigned to undertake drift-net surveillance in the North Pacific, sought to access Chitose Air base in northern Honshu for the 6-week period when this surveillance is required. Chitose would have made an ideal staging ground for what is the performance a **UN** mandated activity. Canada was refused, primarily because of the absence of a Visiting Forces Agreement.

e) Canadian and other foreign military personnel on exchange programs with the US military are not allowed to accompany their units when these are rotated to Japan, as the US SOFA only applies to US citizens.

None of these issues is exactly earthshaking, but they are beginning to multiply and, in the absence of mechanisms to deal with them, take on the aspect of barriers to the legitimate promotion of national interests.

There are thus many dynamics in play that will continue to shape and modify Japanese defence and security policies in the near and mid-term. These will result in an a slow but steady expansion of Japan's role in security affairs. Progressively, they will erode what is and what is not permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution.

Probably, with time, what is not permitted will be clearly centered on three fundamental prohibitions: 1) sending Japanese armed forces to foreign countries or in international airspace or high seas to conduct offensive combat; 2) equipping Japanese forces with offensive or other weapons with intercontinental reach, such as ICBMs, ground to ground missiles, aircraft carriers and other strategic equipment; 3) re-introduction of a conscription system.

### **CONCLUSION**

These reflections have not sought to argue that Japan is surreptitiously embarking on a steady course of military expansion. Nor does Japan's modest but evident willingness to assume new roles mean that it will rely, to any degree, on military capabilities to promote of its economic or other objectives.

But it is on track towards greater commitment to contributing to international peace and security. Indeed, Japan has an increasing responsibility to go down that road. Japan's political and bureaucratic decision making processes and public opinion will determine what roles Japan will play, but the international environment and Japan's national interests which will determine the options.

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